At the same time that I am reviewing "Grief," by Brinkmann, I am also reviewing Martin and Doka's work. This presents some interesting challenges to Brinkman's writing. Brinkmann is approaching grief, not from the perspective of counseling or diagnosing, but from a phenomenological approach: a study of the thing itself. Phenomenological study relies upon observation, and, if possible, experience, of the thing itself, and while scientific data may be used to augment the study, the initial study should be based on direct observation. This is where Martin and Doka's work presents a problem. Are we studying an emotional reaction to a loss, or a cognitive and action-oriented style of dealing with a loss?
This is not the only difficulty with Brinkman's work. He proposes grief as a singular, and defining, characteristic of human beings. This requires that one except that any apparent grief observed in the animal kingdom is simply a form of separation anxiety, rather than true grief. Since we are looking at what can be observed, this does seem to fall at the first fence, as we must accept, to begin with, that animals cannot experience grief, and so that anything that appears to be grief in animals must be explained away as something else.
That grief is a foundational emotion is asserted in chapter two. It starts with an overview of a variety of theories of what emotions are, without Brinkmann committing to any particular decision in this regard. He then outlines what have been considered the foundational emotions. Foundational emotions appear to be those which distinguish us from the animals. This is because these emotions rely on language, and being self-aware. This postulation, of course, assumes that animals have no language, and are not self-aware, which is not exactly something that can be proven: it's simply has to be accepted as an assertion and axiom. The foundational emotions, as agreed to by a variety of philosophers over the years, are anxiety, shame, and guilt. Part of the reason that these emotions are foundational is that they provide us with benefits: anxiety provides us with self-reflection (as well as seeming to provide us with a view of life's possibilities), shame provides us with the ability for moral control, and guilt provides the impetus to become moral beings. To these three classic foundational emotions Brinkmann then adds grief, since grief provides us with the possibility to love, and the awareness that death is inevitable. (Brinkman does not define love, although the way he speaks of it seems to imply that it is attachment to another.)
In chapter three, Brinkmann notes that the self is relational, that the self in a sense only exists in relation to, and in relationships with, others. He also notes that grief is relational in that it involves the loss of another, and that all of psychology must be relational and acknowledge the relationality of the self. He also notes that grief is normative in that grief follows expected cultural patterns.
Chapter four deals with grief and the body. Brinkmann observes a number of factors, symptoms, or expressions of grief as indicated by the body, but also asserts that the body itself forms grief, in some way. While there are a number of observations in this chapter, there is very little in the way of actual evidence, argument, or proof of this assertion.
This statement actually describes much of the book overall. Phenomenological research prides itself on avoiding theories to begin with, but then generates theories. Indeed, Brinkmann's writing refers to a number of theories formulated by prior phenomenologists. Overall, the book raises a number of academic points of interest, but is rather short on evidence and proof in regard to the various assertions and theories.
Chapter four ends with a description of a theory of an ecology of emotion, in that various objects, external to the mind and to the body of the subject, affect the emotions. I was thinking, as I was doing this review, that there was an ecology to my reviewing: there is the book, there is myself, there is my phone that I use for dictating notes, there is the medical office in which I was reviewing that particular chapter, and there was the fact that, in a medical office, you can't do dictation, and so I couldn't take notes. All of this did contribute to one particular emotion: annoyance. The complexity, and yet superficiality, of Brinkmann's work, combined with the fact that I was not able to take specific notes of every trivial evidence of poor argument included in his text.
Emotional ecology, in chapter five, references the extended mind hypothesis: the situation is part of the mind, because the mind can use external objects (such as notepads and calculators) to enhance it's own functions. The proofs of this hypothesis are faulty: generally just redefining terms. At the conclusion of the chapter, Brinkmann notes that grief work takes place between individuals. Unfortunately, this idea is not explored in any depth at any point in the preceding text. It is an interesting and potentially important idea, and it's too bad that it gets short shrift here. Brinkmann also notes de-ritualization of grief in our society. In one sense this is true. We no longer wear black for a year, or wear black armbands, or cover mirrors, when someone dies. Wakes, and other forms of communal grieving, have passed out of fashion, and thus we have lost a number of sources of support for those who are bereaved, and closure for those not as closely related to the deceased person. However, we have started to create additional rituals which Brinkmann does not recognize. For example, there is grief counseling, predicated pretty much universally on the intuitive style of grieving. In a sense we have traded one style of ritual for another. Both styles have their uses, and both styles present problems for the bereaved who do not grieve in that fashion.
Chapter six turns to grief as a psychiatric diagnosis, and the prevalence of diagnostic culture in our society, particularly in relation to grief. It lists the new category of persistent complex bereavement related disorder in the new DSM-5, and, based on at least two sections based on at least two of the sense of symptoms that must be present, I fit the definition of persistent complex bereavement related disorder. I also meet the criteria for prolonged grief disorder, from the World Health Organization. The bulk of the chapter turns to the question of what is a mental disorder or how you define one.
Chapter seven asserts that grief is universal and an important part of human culture, and reiterates that grief is the price of love, and hence it is important. Unfortunately Brinkmann has still never once defined what love is. He also here, in a slightly different wording and emphasis, demonstrates an awareness only of the intuitive style of grieving. This is somewhat odd, since, in some earlier chapters, there is a mention of different types of grief work, which should indicate an awareness of the instrumental style of grieving as well. However, in the earlier mentions of grief work, there is no definite outline of what this different kind of work may be, so I may be giving Brinkman too much credit in this regard.
Overall, phenomenological research and study does have an inherent problem in being both anti-theory, and theory-creating, at the same time. This material is of academic interest, and may raise some interesting questions for further study. However it is of extremely limited use in dealing with actual grief or the bereaved.
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